We study the link between institutional ownership stability and dividend payout ratio. We find that stable and large institutional owners favour dividend paying companies. There also exists a positive association between ownership persistence and dividend payout. Conversely, firms that change their dividend payout frequently are associated with larger deviations in the proportions of the shares held by the institutional investors. However, the extent to which institutional investors require companies to pay dividends depends on the influence they can exert on managers. Pressure-insensitive investors, i.e., investment companies and advisors, rely less on dividends as a disciplinary mechanism, unlike bank trusts and insurance companies that may have other business relationships with the incumbent firms. Our results are consistent with the view that institutional investors play an important role in reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. JEL classification: G32; G35
Introduction
Institutional investors hold more than half of the total outstanding equity of U.S. listed companies (Tonello and Rabimov, 2010) . Given their increasing economic power and clout, coupled with the fact that many of them tend to be ardent activist investors, it is imperative to study how institutional investors influence corporate financial policies. In this paper, we examine how dividend payments at U.S. firms are influenced by institutional investors' ownership stability.
Studies on the monitoring effects of institutional investors are incomplete without consideration to the stability of their shareholdings (Gaspar et al. 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Yan and Zhang, 2010; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Elyasiani et al., 2010; Attig et al. 2012; Callen and Fang, 2013) . Institutional investors who maintain their shareholdings at investee firms over the long run are more incentivised to monitor managers. Their ability to force dividend policies that mitigate agency concerns is directly linked to both the size and the duration of their investments. For instance, dividend smoothing is more prevalent among firms that are closely monitored by institutional investors (Leary and Michaely, 2011) . Gaspar, Massa, Matos, Patgiri and Rehman (2012) find that the frequency and amount of share repurchases increase with ownership by short-term investors to the detriment of dividends.
We complement the literature on the relationship between institutional ownership and dividend policy by examining the effects of institutional investors' stability. More precisely, we measure investor's stability using two variables, i.e., volatility and persistence. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the quarterly proportions of institutional shareholdings.
Persistence is the reciprocal of volatility multiplied by the average of the quarterly proportions. Thus, institutional stability is associated with lower volatility and higher persistence.
To the extent that institutional investors prefer dividend as an instrument to mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) , we expect to find a positive association between dividend payments and persistence in their quarterly holdings. Equally, we expect to find higher volatility in institutional ownership proportions at companies that pay little in dividend. On the contrary, if the presence of institutional investors mitigates investors' concerns that management will squander the firm's free cash flows, then corporations do not have to pay dividends (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) . Provided that the presence of institutional investors and the payment of dividend act as substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency concerns, then the hypothesised positive relationship between the two may not exist.
Using quarterly data on institutional ownership and dividend payments during the period 1980 to 2013, we provide new interesting results on the relation between institutional ownership stability and payout policy. First, using probit regressions, we find that dividend paying firms are associated with each of the following: high proportions of shares held by institutional investors, high persistence in institutional ownership and low volatility in the proportions of shares held by them. Second, higher payout ratios are associated with higher persistence and lower volatility in the proportions of shares held by the institutional investors.
Third, firms with high volatility in institutional ownership proportions are also associated with high volatility in their dividend payout ratios. In contrast, firms with high persistence in the proportions of shares held by institutional investors are associated with lower volatility in their dividend payout ratios. Overall, our findings are in accordance with the agency theory and the view that institutional investors favour both dividend paying firms and stable dividend payouts. Nonetheless, the extent to which institutional investors are able to influence dividend payout depends on the amount of pressure they can exert on the managers. Institutional investors who are less constrained in their ability to monitor, discipline, and impose controls (i.e., pressure-insensitive investors that include investment companies and independent investment advisors) rely less on the force of dividend to curtail managers' largesse. We find that the relationship between dividend and institutional ownership holds only for pressuresensitive investors, i.e., investors that engage in other business relationships with the firms, which include banks and insurance companies. To protect their business relationships they would not want to challenge managers' decisions; instead, they resort to dividends as a means of reigning in managerial excesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section III, we describe the sample, data and variables. In Section IV, we describe the methods used. We present and discuss our findings in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Literature review and Hypotheses Development
Studies on the relationship between shareholding and dividend policy include Rozeff (1982) , Dempsey and Laber (1992) , Eckbo and Verma (1994) , Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) , Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995), Del Guercio (1996) , Strickland (1996) , Heaton (1998), Jain (1999) , Binay (2001), Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) , PerezGonzalez (2003) , Grinstein and Michaely (2005) , Amihud and Li (2006) , Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) among others. Rozeff (1982) and Dempsey & Laber (1992) find that the percentage of stocks held by insiders adversely affects the dividend payout ratio, while the number of shareholders positively affects it. Eckbo and Verma (1994) find that average cash dividend yield increases significantly with corporate/institutional shareholders' ownership proportions. In their sample of firms that are controlled by corporate/institutional shareholders, 100% pay dividends. Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) document a strong positive association between dividend payout policy and institutional ownership.
Based on the signalling hypothesis, corporations do not need to pay dividend if the presence of institutional investors mitigates investors' concerns that management will waste the firm's free cash flows. The presence of institutional investors and the payment of dividend act as substitutes. By virtue of their size and the fact that they are fiduciaries and invest on behalf of others, large institutional investors can allocate more resources toward monitoring a firm's management and perform a more comprehensive review of the firm's prospect.
Nonetheless, smaller shareholders tend to free ride on the decision of larger/institutional investors and that dissuades the latter from providing direct monitoring (Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) ). Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) test the effects of the following variables on the dividend payout ratio: percent of common stock held by insiders, natural log of the number of shareholders, and the percent of common stock held by institutions. Based on their findings, Moh'd, Perry and Laber (1995) establish that the payment of dividend serves two purposes: (i) to attract large and/or institutional investors and (ii) to limit the ability of managers to squander excess cash (also see Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) ).
Besides their ability to monitor and the compensation they receive for that service, institutional investors favour dividend-paying stocks for a number of reasons. Many institutions rely on a steady stream of dividend income to meet their ongoing liabilities (for instance, pension funds and insurance companies). Overreliance on capital gains can lead to income shortages in down markets. Dividend, on the other hand, is relatively more stable.
Institutional investors who benefit from tax rebates (for instance, pension funds and endowment funds) will favour dividend-paying firms for their investment portfolio.
Furthermore, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) argue that undervalued companies would want to signal their strength to the market and will do so by paying dividends that entice institutional investors, whose presence will vouch for the value of the company.
We contribute to the literature on institutional ownership and dividend policy by examining how the long run stability in the shareholdings of institutional investors affects a firm's dividend policy.
Hypotheses
Under Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, managers' mismanagement of excess cash will lead to agency conflicts. The payment of dividend can minimize these conflicts. By transferring the company's cash to shareholders, managers are left with little money to waste on suboptimal investment projects. Under such circumstances, dividend acts as a form of discipline on incumbent managers.
Companies plagued with agency conflicts would constrain institutional investors' ability to meet their fiduciary responsibilities vis-à-vis their investors. To the extent that payment of dividend is a show of a firm's cash generating strength and its intolerance for conflicts, institutional investors would favour dividend-paying firms as their investments.
Besides, and as argued earlier, certain institutions favour dividend-paying companies for tax reasons.
H1: Firms with greater institutional holdings pay out more dividends.
Not all institutional investors benefit from the same tax advantages. For instance, banks and investment companies do not benefit from the same exemptions as pension funds.
Banks are heavily regulated and are forced to abide by the prudent-man rules. These constraints will weigh heavily in their selections of target companies. Therefore, we test the relation between the holdings of the different institutional groups and the dividend payout policy.
H2: The strength of the relationship between investors and dividend depends on the type of the institutional investor.
On the assumption that the signalling hypothesis (Zeckhauser and Pound (1990)) holds, i.e., the presence of institutional investors and the payment of dividend are substitute mechanisms to discipline managers, then it is important to differentiate between the types of institutional investors who can perform that disciplinary function. To avoid compromising their existing or potential business dealings with the firms, banks ( 1) and insurance companies ( 2) are less likely to challenge management decisions (see Brickley et al., 1988 , Almazan et al., 2005 , Chen et al., 2005 , Cornett et al. 2007 . They are known as pressure-sensitive investors. On the other hand, investment companies ( 3) and investment advisers ( 4) are not subject to these pressures and are more able to press management for changes. They are known as pressure-insensitive investors. Almazan et al. (2005 ), Chen et al. (2007 and Cornett et al. (2007) There is a strong desire among managers to maintain dividend payments and engage in dividend smoothing. That was true decades ago (Lintner (1956) ) and is still true in the 21 st century (Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) ). Brav et al. (2005) 
III. Data and Sample
Our (2005)).
In Table 1 , we present the sample distribution by industry using the Fama-French 12- We divide the sample into two, i.e., those with nonzero reported figures for institutional ownership vs. those without, and compare various financial characteristics between the two. We present our findings in Panel A of Table 2 . We find that there exist significant differences between the two subsamples on all the reported financial characteristics. Firms with institutional owners are larger in terms of market capitalization, have higher market-to-book ratio, retained earnings-to-total equity, total equity-to-total assets, return on assets and turnover ratio. Their sales growth lags the firms without institutional owners though.
[
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We perform a similar analysis between dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying ones and report our findings in Panel B of Table 2 . Dividend paying firms are larger and more profitable. The mean values of size and the various profitability ratios are significantly higher for the subsample of dividend paying firms.
IV. Methodology

IV.1 Measures of Dividend Payout Ratio
We construct three alternative measures of dividend payments. The first one is a dummy variable representing dividend paying firms. The other two capture the magnitude of the dividend payment, i.e., the dividend-to-earnings ( / ) ratio and the dividend-toassets ratio ( / ). We do not use the dividend yield ratio, i.e., the ratio of dividend per share-to-market price per share, since managers do not exert direct and spontaneous control on the share price. To address issues with outliers, we winsorize / and / at the 1% and 99% percentiles.
IV.2 Measures of Institutional Ownership Stability
Following Elyasiani, Jia and Mao (2010), we calculate several measures of institutional ownership based on five-year rolling periods (i.e., 20 quarters). To eliminate the effects of any short-term temporary shock and to capture the delayed response of dividend policy to ownership changes, Elyasiani and Jia (2010) recommend the use of data measured over a longer term time period, i.e., 20 quarters. The variables are as follows:
, refers to the proportion of shares held by institutional investor in quarter (1) , refers to the proportion of shares held by all institutional investors in firm in ( 4) refers to the standard deviation of the quarterly holdings of institutional investor over the last 20 quarters
refers to the average of the standard deviations of all institutional investors in firm . This is also our measure of institutional ownership volatility ( ). 
IV.3 Measuring the effects of institutional ownership stability on the firm's propensity to pay dividend and the magnitude of its dividend payout ratio
We first examine how institutional ownership stability affects the firm's decision to pay dividends. We estimate a firm's propensity to pay dividend by using the following model adapted from Grullon et al. (2002) , DeAngelo et al. (2006) , and Banyi and Kahle (2014) 
where takes a value of one for firm-year observation with nonzero cash dividend, else it takes a value of zero; is the firm's market capitalization, represent the percentage increase in sales, is the standard deviation of the predicted daily returns using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, refers to the standard deviation of the residuals from the three-factor model, represents the ratio of retained earnings-to-total equity, represents the ratio of total equity-to-total assets, is the ratio of cash and bank balances-to-total assets, is the return on assets, is the ratio of average trading volumes-to-total number of shares outstanding, and , and are as defined earlier.
To estimate the logistic regression, we follow the methodology of Fama and McBeth (1973) . We estimate the regression using all firm observations in each of the 34 years comprising the sample period. We report the average coefficients of the variables in Table 3 and report -statistics that are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. (Fama and French, 2002) . Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) show that firms with illiquid stocks tend to maintain dividend payments ( ).
To estimate the effect of institutional ownership stability on the magnitude of the dividend payout ratio, we rerun the regression on the ratios of total dividend-to-total earnings ( / ) and total dividend-to-total assets ( / ), respectively. Instead of the logistic regression, we perform a panel fixed-effect regression on the dividend payout ratios.
VI.4 Institutional ownership between dividend paying and non-dividend paying propensity-matched firms
We use equation (9) to compute a propensity score for each firm, i.e., the likelihood that the firm will pay dividend. We then break the sample into two, i.e., between dividend and non-dividend paying firms based on actual (not predicted) outcome. For each dividend paying firm, we select a firm from the non-dividend paying sample with the closest propensity score. We end up with a sample of propensity-matched non-dividend paying firms.
We then compare the proportion, volatility and persistence of institutional ownerships between the dividend paying and the propensity-matched non-dividend paying samples. We also include the propensity score of all firms in the panel fixed-effect regressions (represented by the variable ) to control for self-selection bias and endogeneity.
The institutions for which shareholdings data are provided in Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database include bank trusts ( 1), insurance companies ( 2), investment companies ( 3), investment advisors ( 4), and others including pension funds and endowments ( 5). To ensure that our findings are not driven by a particular subsample of institutional investors, we also study the effect of each subcategory separately.
VI.5 Analysing the volatility in the dividend payout ratios
We calculate the standard deviation of the dividend payout ratios of sampled firms on a five-year rolling basis. The higher the value, the less stable is the firm's dividend payments.
We compare and contrast that measure between the samples of firms with low vs. high institutional ownerships. We perform a panel fixed-effect regression to establish the link between the volatility in dividend payments and the stability in the shareholdings of the institutional investors. To make all the variables in the model contemporaneous, we use rolling five-year standard deviations of the control variables in the regressions.
V. Results
V.1. Institutional ownership stability and the firm's propensity to pay dividend
We run a logistic regression on the firms' decision to pay dividend and present our findings in Results based on the logistic regressions establish the link between dividend payers and institutional ownership. To ensure consistency we replace the dependent variable with the dividend payout ratio and run a panel fixed-effect regression involving the same independent variables and present our findings in Table 4 . The panel fixed-effect regression also allows us to test the effect of institutional ownership on the magnitude of the dividend payments. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the ratio of dividend-to-total earnings( / ); in panel B the dependent variable is the ratio of dividend-to-total assets ( / ).
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While the coefficient of and retain their sign and significance as in the earlier regressions, the coefficient of is not significant anymore (consistent with Del Guercio (1996), Grinstein and Michaely (2005)). Thus, the size of institutional shareholdings does not determine the amount of dividend to be paid. On the other hand, the stability of their shareholdings exerts a more significant influence. Volatility in the institutional shareholdings decreases the payout ratios while stability increases them. The effects of the remainder independent variables are similar to that documented in Table 3 .
V.2 Comparing institutional ownership between payers and propensity matched nonpayers
In the following sections, we focus only on dividend-paying firms, while nondividend paying firms form a control group. We break the sample into two, i.e., dividend and non-dividend paying firms. For each dividend-paying firm, we select a firm from the nondividend paying sample with the closest propensity score using equation (9). We then compare the proportion, volatility and persistence of institutional ownerships between the dividend paying and the propensity-matched non-dividend paying samples. We perform the analysis for the overall sample of institutional investors as well as by subsamples, i.e., banks (i.e., 1), insurance companies ( 2), investment companies and their managers ( 3), independent investment advisors ( 4), and all others ( 5), respectively. We present our findings in Table 5 .
[INSERT 
V.3 The effects of pressure-sensitive vs. pressure-insensitive investors on dividends
We repeat the analysis of Table 4 using matched-firm adjusted values (i.e., we subtract the matched-firm nonpayer value from that of the dividend paying firm).Furthermore, we include the stability measure by ownership type, (i.e., 1and 5) to see if the relationship depends on the type of the institutional owner. We present our findings in Table   6 . The analysis is restricted to dividend paying firms. The dependent variable is / .
V.4 Institutional ownership stability and dividend payout stability
In this section, we test how volatility in the dividend payments is related to institutional ownership stability amongst dividend-paying firms. To measure the volatility in dividend payments, we compute the five-year rolling standard deviation of the / ratio. We split the sample into two, i.e., low volatility versus high volatility based on the sample mean, and we compare and contrast , and between the two.
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The mean and median values of and are higher in the subsample of firms with low volatility in dividend payout, and they are lower in the subsample of firms with high volatility in dividend payout (both mean and median values of the difference in and are highly significant). Thus, institutional owners prefer firms that exhibit low volatility in dividend payout. On the other hand, and volatility in / are directly related.
For instance, the mean and median values of are higher (significant at the 1% level) in the subsample of firms with high volatility in the dividend payout ratio. The results are robust to the various classifications of the institutional investors.
We perform a multiple regression on the volatility of the dividend paying firms' / ratios and present our findings in Table 8 . In Panel A, we include all institutional owners. We find that is inversely related to the standard deviation in the dividend payout ratio while is positively related to the ratio. The coefficient of is positive and highly significant. The coefficient of is negative and significant at the 0.01 level.
The results suggest that institutional investors avoid firms with volatile dividend payments and there is a high turnover in the proportions of the shares held by institutional investors at these firms.
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In Model 2, the variable is negative and significant suggesting that volatility in the dividend payout ratio is inversely related to the persistence of the institutional shareholdings. In Panel B, we present the findings based on the types of institutional owners.
We observe that the same relationship between / volatility and exists in each model, except that the coefficient is not significant for 3 and 4, which represent investment companies and independent investment advisors, respectively. Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, pressure-insensitive investors ( 3 and 4) can force disciplinary actions on managers without having recourse to dividends.
VI. Conclusion
We study the link between the stability of institutional ownership and dividend payments at U.S. corporations. We consistently find that persistence (defined as mean over standard deviation) in the quarterly proportions of shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with (i) dividend paying firms, (ii) higher dividend payout ratios and (iii) lower volatility in the dividend payout ratios. Thus, companies that pay stable dividend over time tend to attract long-term institutional investors.
The likelihood of a firm paying dividend is positively linked to the proportion and stability of the shares held by the institutional investors and is inversely linked to the volatility in the institutional shareholdings. The size of the shareholding is not linked to the amount of dividend paid. Instead, volatility is inversely linked to the firm's dividend payout ratio while persistence is positively linked to it. The substitution effect between the payment of dividend and the presence of institutional investors only holds for pressure-insensitive investors (i.e., investment companies and advisors). We find no significant relationship between either the dividend payout ratio or the volatility in that ratio and the persistence in the shareholdings of pressure-insensitive investors.
We document evidence that institutional shareholders prefer less volatility in the dividend payout ratios. Both the size and persistence of institutional shareholdings are lower amongst firms with high volatility in dividend payout ratio. We observe less stability in the proportions of shares held by institutional investors amongst firms with above average volatility in the dividend payout ratio.
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